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The Security Management System from the Perspective of the Global Energy Crisis and the Extended Black Sea Region Escalating Conflict

Golea, Daniela Georgiana; Radu, Andreea Florina; Tănase, Tiberiu (2022), The Security Management System from the Perspective of the Global Energy Crisis and the Extended Black Sea Region Escalating Conflict, Cunoașterea Științifică, 1:2, 34-45Golea, Daniela Georgiana; Radu, Andreea Florina; Tănase, Tiberiu (2022), The Security Management System from the Perspective of the Global Energy Crisis and the Extended Black Sea Region Escalating Conflict, Cunoașterea Științifică, 1:2, 34-45, https://www.cunoasterea.ro/the-security-management-system-from-the-perspective-of-the-global-energy-crisis-and-the-extended-black-sea-region-escalating-conflict/



Mediul de securitate contemporan suferă mutații din ce în ce mai imprevizibile, și pe scena internațională pare a apare tendința unui conflict care amenință să izbucnească în orice moment, devenind un conflict deschis, violent și capabil să se răspândească rapid peste tot; deși timp de decenii sursa conflictului părea a fi regiunea Orientului Mijlociu, mai recent, această sursă de conflicte globale pare să se deplaseze puțin mai spre nord, ajungând în Regiunea Extinsă a Mării Negre (EBSR). Aparent, în EBSR sunt marile resurse fosile care vor fi importante odată ce bazinele de petrol/gaz din Orientul Mijlociu vor fi epuizate. Momentul epuizării resurselor fosile din Orientul Mijlociu nu este prea departe. EBSR va deveni centrul de interes global și această mutare a sursei globale de conflict în regiunea Mării Negre duce la necesitatea dezvoltării unor modele noi și speciale de management al securității naționale. Dar în ce direcție? Această întrebare, printre altele, atrage atenția cercetării științifice în acest important domeniu al securității. Primul scop ar putea fi doar aflarea adevărului, pentru că numai pe baza adevărului putem dezvolta modelul adecvat de management.


Cuvinte cheie: regiunea extinsă a Mării Negre, sistemul de management al securității, criza din Ucraina, criza energetică globală, resurse fosile



The contemporary security environment has increasingly unpredictable mutations and the international scene seems to be gripped by a conflict that threatens to erupt at any moment, becoming an open conflict, violent and able to spread quickly everywhere; although for decades the source of conflict appeared to be the Middle East region, more recently, this source of global conflicts seems to move a little further to the north, reaching the Extended Black Sea Region (EBSR). Apparently, in EBSR are the great fossil resources that will be important once the basins of oil/gas from the Middle East will be depleted. The moment of fossil resources depletion in the Middle East is not too far. The EBSR will become the global centre of interest and this move of the global source of conflict in the Black Sea region leads to the need to develop new and special models for the management of national security. But going towards which direction? This question among others raises the attention of the scientific research in this important area of security. The first goal could only be to find out the truth, because only based on truth we can develop the appropriate model of management.


Keywords: Extended Black Sea Region, Security Management System, Ukraine Crisis, Global Energy Crisis, fossil resources


CUNOAȘTEREA ȘTIINȚIFICĂ, Volumul 1, Numărul 2, Decembrie 2022, pp. 34-45
ISSN 2821 – 8086, ISSN – L 2821 – 8086
URL: https://www.cunoasterea.ro/the-security-management-system-from-the-perspective-of-the-global-energy-crisis-and-the-extended-black-sea-region-escalating-conflict/
© 2022 Daniela Georgiana Golea, Andreea Florina Radu, Tiberiu Tănase. Responsabilitatea conținutului, interpretărilor și opiniilor exprimate revine exclusiv autorilor


The Security Management System from the Perspective of the Global Energy Crisis and the Extended Black Sea Region Escalating Conflict

Drd. Daniela Georgiana GOLEA (National Intelligence Academy ”Mihai Viteazul”), Dr. Andreea Florina RADU (Babes Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca), Col (r ) Dr. Tiberiu TĂNASE



Lately, Romanian political world has been seething because of numerous clashes between different political factions and the interest groups around them. Behind this wriggling, among other reasons there was the German intervention (by the iron hand of Chancellor Angela Merkel) in EBSR together with the tough reply that Russia (Russian Federation) gave regarding the overthrow of the political regime in Ukraine, an event which the Russian management considered, from the outset, as the effect of a crisis induced by the activity of US officials or those affiliated to this military power. In this context, it becomes more and more difficult to see the truth; moreover, to discern between propaganda and reality is increasingly difficult, as long as one can only hear the sources of propaganda while impartiality of scientists is evaded.

Russia’s tough (military) reply for the purposes of recovering its territories, which entered the American sphere of influence overnight, aroused the concern of Germany – the great European political and military power of the moment. It has considered appropriate to approach EBSR to monitor the developments as close as possible. Such a situation has generated Germany’s sudden interest in Romania, a state that Germany otherwise had no close relations with after the majority of German communities in Romania have completely deserted this territory since the 90s.

In 2012, it was remarkable Germany’s sudden interest in involving in regional issues, aiming both Romania and the Republic of Moldavia, clearly supporting the unification of the two states within the Extended Black Sea Region framework.

As the global conflict deepened and moved its centre of gravity in EBSR, thus including the reawakening of old intentions of world hegemony and even a partially return to the context of the Cold War, the US has launched an intense propaganda campaign against Russia, based on ideas and already worn arguments in previous conflicts such as the first or the second Gulf War. Yet the current public opinion has recently proved less sensitive to handling these manipulating campaigns, being rather sceptical to this conflict.

The security management issue has lately become more and more complicated in the context of the leadership of the national security system, which tends to be commissioned by influences that have nothing to do with the nation concept and the Romanian state anymore. In this situation the best option we have is to examine the elements of regional and global security scene, with greatest concern, in order to identify the basics which might help us define the new concept of national security management.


In recent months, anyone trying to remind their fellows the historical truth related to Ukraine comes to be considered a Russophile, unfoundedly. Any historian or scientist, in general, who would try to call the public attention to the way in which Ukraine was founded and especially to its territorial or population composition it is immediately put to the wall and labelled as pro-Russian. Therefore: is historical truth a pro-Russian matter?

The scientists’ world should not have to do with propaganda-related services affiliated to political circles nor should allow the infiltration of such services in scientific activities. These activities must be kept relatively independent, unaltered by the interferences of propaganda services and meant to continue searching for the truth, by the use of objective mechanisms specific to scientific research and knowledge. The ultimate goal of scientific work is to demonstrate (solely in order to respect the truth and preserving the objectivity and not support a specific interest) with sufficient and relevant arguments and evidence, that there is a certain state of affairs but also to explain phenomena and processes which led to the present context, predicting the ways in which the situation may evolve and opinions on the artificial intervention on it.

If scientific research is not let to operate normally, then:

  • researchers will be unable to access the actual data of the problem or will be prevented to appropriately process these data in order to obtain accurate results;
  • even if scientific research would be successfully conducted, its results could be deterred by being published or disseminated through different channels, thus information being transformed into knowledge;
  • scientific research overlaps over the noise made by propagandists, who almost obsessively repeat the same ideas hoping to convince and manipulate the audience; generally, if we talk about propaganda, they are looking to identify the weaknesses (at emotional level) of the target audience, in order to outbid exactly the ideas which emotionally might easily influence people; in the same time, while authentic scientific research is completely indifferent to affective issues and it does not seek to alter the results as they wish (or not) to the public; this makes the overall perception of scientific research results by the public to be less important than how the same public would perceive the ideas transmitted by propaganda, which is much closer to the affective forum, generally seeking to convey exactly what the public wants to hear;
  • the results of scientific research might often not coincide with the declared political goals, so that these results will be denied by state representatives who can often ridicule or belittle them in other ways.

Figure 1 Romania together with the fragments that build the current Ukrainian state


Figure 1 presents some torn (by territorial rapt) from Poland, a part of Slovakia, two pieces of Romania, a part of southern Belarus (by administrative-territorial divisions within USSR) part of western Russia and Crimea (in 1954). From the territorial point of view Ukraine is an almost inexistent state, that may crumble any time under the claims of the true owners of all these territories: Russians, Poles, Romanians, Slovaks, Byelorussians.

To get objective results, driven by reality and in order to identify the best option of collecting and processing actual data, it is necessary to observe above all a series of aspects of the actual situation, eliminating any propaganda interference, as such:

  • currently, Russia is subjected to a multidimensional aggression carried out mainly on political, military, imago-logical, psychological, propaganda, economic dimensions; propaganda presents Russia as an aggressor, while in reality this federation of states is simply defending its territory and interests;
  • as in the revolutionary events in Timisoara during 17-19.12.1989, in Ukraine (2014) we had to deal with the coordinated activity of various groups of agitators (specialists in research-diversion) who created and maintained a series of street disturbances that led in a rather suspicious manner to the removal, in fact unlawful, by unconstitutional aggressive mechanisms, of the president Viktor Fedorovich Yanukovich;
  • relative to Ukraine’s total population, the support of Pyotr Alekseyevici Poroșenko’s so-called revolutionary political regime is actually less than 4-5%; otherwise, Poroshenko is not a politician in every sense of the word, but, in reality, he is a businessman (billionaire), acting on typical business environment (E.g.: the pursuit of profit, hedge techniques, protection of own businesses and promoting them through political leverage );
  • there is no Ukrainian state itself; nor ever; and this is because the two main attributes of statehood are missing, namely: territory and nation, and in the alternative, the cultural identity and a language of its own; Ukraine is a kind of Republic of Moldavia at a larger scale; Ukrainian territory is made of pieces plucked either by force (from other states) or by administrative-territorial division (within the USSR) consisting basically of a piece of southern Belarus, a piece of south-western Russia (including Crimea), a piece of Poland, several fragments of Romania, a small piece of Hungary and one of Slovakia: there is not a territorial identity of a Ukrainian state;

Historical Map of Ukraine

Figure 2 – Historical Map of Ukraine – territories annexed, when and by whom (sources https://www.globalresearch.ca/who-are-the-ukrainians/5627413)

  • also, there is virtually no Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian territory being inhabited by a variegated, heterogeneous mixture, composed of Russians (the largest proportion), of Belarus, Cossacks (Tatars), Polish, Romanians, Gagauzs (Turkish), Khazars (Hebrew), Hungarians and Gypsies; there is no cultural identity of Ukraine and no Ukrainian language itself: (just like the Moldavian language across the Prut, which is a regional form of Romanian language, the Ukrainian language is a form of Russian language, not very different from this obviously;
  • the real challenge of the Ukrainian conflict is the huge pool of oil in EBSR; we have to remember that a few years ago NATO tried to co-opt states (from EBSR) like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan: the reaction of the Russians back then was immediate and firm; not being able to “touch” these states, NATO turned its attention to Ukraine;
  • such confrontations on EBSR related to petroleum basins in the Middle East are about to be exhausted in a not too distant future; the next mankind’s accessible big pool (not exploited yet) of fossil fuels is EBSR, in this respect Romania being a sort of Kuwait (that is a small country, without military power, but well placed geographically) in this new oil area of the world;
  • in this situation, the US (NATO) are directing their attention to the new main oil area of the mankind: the Turks are in NATO but are increasingly independent and hostile to Israel and the US, Turkey being currently subjected to a slow process of Islamization and a gradual abandonment of secular regime; the southern Black Sea has little exploitable oil areas, which are located more toward the North and East of the Black Sea Basin; therefore they cannot rely on Turkey, although it has a large part of the geographical region of the Black Sea;
  • in the coming years we might witness a strong statement from Russia by which it will seek to arouse nationalist and separatist feelings of the Romanian and Gagauz minorities of Ismail and Cahul lands (the Romanian area occupied illicitly by Ukraine) so that this region becomes a new conflict zone located further south of Transnistria; uniting these new secessionist areas with Transnistria (where the strong 14th Russian Army was deployed) could create a bridgehead between Crimea and the mouths of the Danube, thus the Russian military wall would close entirely the access to the so-called Ukraine Sate to the Black Sea, therefore to the most important sources of gas and oil;
  • in view of this scenario, Russia could end up having the border (forcibly, not officially) directly with Romania and may have easy military access to the mouth of the Danube, at which point it will have a word to say to the EU (Largely dependent on the Russian energy policy and on the Chinese labour force);
  • in terms of propaganda, psychologically and imagological, the Russian Orthodox Church (and the Romanian one) will likely play an increasingly important role; that is why lately, the clergy has been heavily infiltrated by agents specialized in psychological operations; Russia will set himself up as the standard bearer of Orthodoxy “against the pagan beast” and will earn a great deal of sympathy even from the Romanian population, otherwise traditionally hostile to Russia; the military conflict will gradually seek to acquire a religious coloratura too, not because it would be so in essence, but because it will be deliberately pursued;
  • as the Russians almost certainly seek to control the Danube’s thread, a commercial thoroughfare of immense economic importance to the EU, a turnaround is expected in Romania, created by the (re)activation of the strong Russian networks infiltrated at different levels (politicians and military, as well as a large number of military special forces hiding among the population) and thus very hard to identify; worth mentioning is that Russia has a whole 5th column of V buried, hibernated, but always apt to be (re)activated in Romania; moreover, since 1994/1995, Russia has funded and trained armed secessionist groups within the Hungarian minority in Harghita and Covasna regions; in this regard, it will not be difficult for the Russians to establish the bridgehead between Crimea and the mouth of the Danube, they already having the strong 14th Army deployed there; then, by (re)activating the hibernating structures in Romania will probably regain the political control in Romania and thereby the control over the course of the Danube; such a scenario would involve abandoning the current state of passivity of Russian structures in Romania, which are currently in a sort of contemplating the actions taken by the Germans in Romania; in this context, a German minority leader as president and supreme commander of the Romanian armed forces represents an extra EU-safety warranty”;
  • with Bulgaria and Serbia, the Russians will not have problems because these countries (slave) are easily to win on their side and are generally hostile to the US;
  • according to some scenarios, it is legally possible to remove the Romanian president; such a scenario could envisage for example that at a certain moment a terrorist attack takes place on the Romanian territory (whether is real or not, one carefully directed and simulated) that would legitimize the measure of the Romanian Parliament to change over to the plan of partial mobilization in Romania, for a limited time, perhaps six months; legally, through mobilization (partial) the full levers of power will pass into the hands of the Parliament, which will control the army and the latter will garner the executive and judicial (court martial) the mechanisms of democratic state law being suspended during mobilization; for such a scenario to be put into practice would not only need an event to shock the public opinion and to give the Parliament the legal reason or pretext even of passing to the Partial Mobilization Plan (Politicians and military, as well as a large number of military special forces hiding among the population);

But who (in Romania) to adopt such a firm position or to resort to such harsh measures? Clearly, then, that such interventions, currently, cannot come but from or to the initiative of external forces.


Undoubtedly, in the context in which the system management is made up of foreigners, possibly controlled or at least influenced by external interests and forces completely foreign to Romania, the national security management becomes very difficult.

In this context, the establishment of a management model that is favourable to Romania’s interests becomes a very delicate task, and somehow impossible to achieve. It still remains the task of evaluating, at least theoretically, in the event of a regional or major global crises, what we could undertake before the situation escalates. No doubt, Romania will have to (re)consider different scenarios regarding such potential crises, seeking possible solutions of extracting itself from the conflict zone and preserving a state of security. It is clear from the outset that any management issue is related to the science (and art) of management. Until we get into details of management issues (most of them, administrative), we have to clarify by means of managerial mechanisms the core issue of the management system. In the case of Romania’s national security system, this problem turns out to be very complicated from the start, getting us to a series of sensitive issues.

If we refer to the aim to develop a management system appropriate to the actual state of play, from the outset starting from reality, we will need to review a number of things we have to take into consideration:

  • Romania is a NATO member state and from this perspective, at least theoretically, nothing can or should compel Romania to participate in an action or take part in a conflict if it harms national interests and enhances unnecessarily the risks to the state security;
  • one of Romania’s most important security needs is to establish good relations with all Romanian communities outside the current national boundaries (the diaspora), actively and regularly participating to support the movements of affirmation of national identity within those communities; the Romanian state should not accept anything that would harm the interests of Romanian communities/territories currently under foreign influence;
  • one of the directives of the national security policy must be that of non-involvement of Romania in conflicts that do not concern its direct interests or even NATO’s interests, treated as a unitary political-military organization and thus, not reduced to the level of a single member state’s interest (USA, for instance);
  • putting the national security management system under permanent verification in order to remove foreign influences from Romania’s national interests, an aim which is becoming more and more difficult to achieve if the key functions of this mechanism are more and more occupied by foreign nationals, persons who are legally and naturally responsible to other services than the national ones; it is not for the first time in the Romanian history when the leadership was carried out by foreigners and historical experience has shown that such regimes could give good results if and only if they are controlled and influenced by Romanian political circles able to constantly identify and pursue national interests;
  • a very important aspect is thus the establishment of some organizations at civil society level, which should be detached from partisan influences and outside the political arena funding mechanisms; a good starting point for this is the model of the Solidarity trade union from Poland (in the 80s), which started from a union (professional organization aimed at protecting the rights of working people) and turned itself by merging with other similar organizations into a large national organization that brought together almost all fields of activity; it is very important in the current context, that population of Romanian nationality unite in trade unions independent from those politically controlled, so that only Romanian communities will have representatives through which they can promote their interests and wishes at the highest level;
  • another important aspect which is indirectly linked to the national security management system (or the control over this leadership) is the filtering of data and factual and useful information, and providing of correct and timely information flow, disseminating it to as large as possible circles of people, thus information processing becoming useful knowledge to training experience; for this it would be necessary to establish, at the same time with the organization mentioned above, of some magazines/publications (in printed or electronic versions) in order to ensure the continuous transparency of the organization’s activity and in the same time to inform the population about measures taken so far or other foreseen projects;
  • the above mentioned is important in this context where at present, in fact, all mass media means in Romania are under foreign influence, in other words, the Romanians have virtually no mass media (written or television) that represent their full and impartial interests, except theoretically the national television, but this, by law, is politically controlled by the Romanian state leadership.

All aspects emphasized lead to the need of managerial reconfiguration of the security system in terms of the need to urgently ensure a means of control over the activity of foreign citizens who have access to the Romanian state leadership. This is especially true when we find a sharp drop in the capability of the Parliament to meet these needs.


Currently it is very difficult for anyone in Romania to adopt a firm political stand in the regional conflict in EBSR, where on either side of the barricade there are no forces amicable to Romania. On one side, there are the American interests (indifferent to Romania’s interests and much more) and on the other hand there are the Russian interests, who had always territorial claims over small countries in Eastern Europe, as well as claims of a hegemony world. Over these comes China’s emerging power, which makes the overall situation become even more sensitive.

The general framework reminds us of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878: our interest back then was to throw out the Turks, but once the Russians entered the Romanian territory, they did not want to leave anymore. Only the firm intervention of the Western Europe powers, in 1878, (geared especially by France in these diplomatic efforts) made the Tsarist Russia in the end to accept the withdrawal of its army from the territory of the Romanian Principalities and later the return to Bucharest of the Romanian government sent initially in exile.

Romania could take advantage of the sensitive Russian-American and even of the Russian-EU relations to promote more loyal Romanians at the leadership of the state apparatus. Yet, it is unlikely that this action will be easily accepted by the Russians, who (like the USA), have no interest that the Romanians govern themselves.

In this context it becomes very difficult for a Romanian to adopt a firm position of political (and military) support of any of the foreign forces which are currently arguing in silence (thankfully) the hegemony over Romania. Depending on the concrete manner in which the conflict between the Russians and EU-USA develop, the Romanians could work towards the removal of foreign political regime influence.


For the time being, for Romania it would be best that balance of the conflict of hegemony does not move too much in one direction or another. If the “front line” in the battle for regional hegemony will be stabilized over the territory of Ukraine (making Romania a buffer zone with a no-man’s land regime), then it could be possible to create favourable prerequisites for imposing a political regime of its own and release the Romanian state apparatus from foreign political influences.

In this context, Romania should give more importance at developing special armed forces, characterized by a great capacity for self-supporting and specialized in operations specific to resistance war and subversive operations. (The Special Purpose Forces – following the Soviet model of SPEŢNAZ- Войска специального назначения ) (Cozma, 2015).

Additionally, it is very important for Romania to develop technologies specific to unconventional (non-NBC) and asymmetric war, based on hybrid forms of fight. Therefore, the research-development activity conducted within the National Defence University, National Intelligence Agency, the Military Technical Academy and the Academies corresponding to force categories should focus their capacities also in this direction.

With reduced number of soldiers and atypical endowments, of non-NBC unconventional armaments (infra- and ultrasonic, subliminal, electromagnetic, geophysical weapons etc.) and also using groups of combat forces composed of fighters without uniform, insignia and weapons in sight, applying guerrilla and specific subversive activities tactics. The establishment of these troops may be done by benefiting from the needs of the context (countering terrorism, the need to combat organized crime, the emergence of new and atypical hybrid challenges etc.) and using these needs as the motivation to build armed forces actually intended to resistance fight and, in general, to special warfare actions. Once (re)established, they would not be under the direct control of any foreign political and military forces or under the Russian control, but with its own command and control system.

It is hard to say at the moment what exactly should compose this system of command and control, so as to be nearly neutral to the political regime of the state and therefore, as little affected as possible by the political decisions at central level. These task forces destined to resistance fight must have their own leadership bodies, unaffected by the political leadership of the state and able to remain untouched even in case of foreign occupation. So that, in any situation the Romanian state would find itself, such forces would unalterable be able to ensure the continuity of armed resistance, the combat actions necessary for the conservation of the national territory and defence of the interests of the nation.

In the current political-military context, more and more complex, virtually Romania is seen caught in the clash between the world superpowers disputing their hegemony, the contact line currently being placed just near the geographical position of our country. It is absolutely crucial that by our actions we act in such a manner that the front line does not overlap exactly over Romania’s territory but is kept to the east, over Ukraine (where it actually finds itself at present).

For this, a model for security management must be developed, so that it provides new forms of control over the management activity of this system.

In this paper, we have provided some recommendations on possible solutions to be analyzed in this area, but there are certainly also other solutions that we have not reviewed. As regards the national defence, in our view, we could be able to count only partly on NATO forces intervention, but primarily on a local military force specialized in conducting resistance fight, especially urban guerrilla. Traditionally, Romania has passed through such a similar situation, especially after the political and military measures during 1968-1969 and the legislative changes (on defence and security) since the early 70s of the last century. But such forces were generally (and erroneously) deconstructed after December 1989. So, it has probably arrived the moment to restore them in a form, adapted to the current context and to the modern technologies.


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