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Information sabotage in the context of the communist regime. Case study on communist informers

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Perța, Ana-Maria (2024), Information sabotage in the context of the communist regime. Case study on communist informers, Cunoașterea Științifică, 3:4, https://www.cunoasterea.ro/information-sabotage-in-the-context-of-the-communist-regime/

 

Abstract

Information sabotage is a direct threat to a state’s independence and sovereignty and is therefore a tool for mass manipulation. People are aware of the fact that when faced with this phenomenon, the average person often loses the battle against the false information propagated by the system, and the person who obtains the information directly from the source is the one who processes, distorts, and takes advantage of it. The current paper aims to inform the readers about the concept of information sabotage, present in all contemporary societies and frequently used during the communist regime in Romania and beyond. According to the National Council for the Study of Security Archives, the communist period and the revolution caused the disappearance of many incriminating documents, thus not all those responsible were punished. However, with the help of the population and the remains, the deeply buried „crimes” of the terror regime can be exposed, returning some of the lost justice to the righteous. Examining the CNSAS records and the court decisions that served as the foundation for the „enemies of the party” penalties was also useful. They were utilized to identify the primary sabotage techniques used by informers as well as the consequences experienced by the system’s victims. We consider the study of this article beneficial to all those interested in approaching another perspective of the communist regime, as well as those interested in the phenomenon of information sabotage, explored in depth in this article from the perspective of informer’s crimes. Thus, considering the above, the originality of the present work is given by the perspective of approaching the subject, managing to conclude the broad subject of information sabotage in the context of the communist period to the most important aspects studied in this article.

Keywords: informer, blackmail, recruitment, conviction, propaganda

Sabotajul informațional în contextul regimului comunist. Studiu de caz despre informatorii comuniști

Rezumat

Sabotajul informațional este o amenințare directă la adresa independenței și suveranității unui stat și, prin urmare, este un instrument de manipulare în masă. Oamenii sunt conștienți de faptul că, atunci când se confruntă cu acest fenomen, omul obișnuit pierde adesea lupta împotriva informațiilor false propagate de sistem, iar persoana care obține informațiile direct de la sursă este cea care prelucrează, distorsionează și preia. avantajul. Lucrarea de față își propune să informeze cititorii despre conceptul de sabotaj informațional, prezent în toate societățile contemporane și folosit frecvent în timpul regimului comunist în România și nu numai. Potrivit Consiliului Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii, perioada comunistă şi revoluţia au provocat dispariţia multor documente incriminatoare, astfel nu toţi responsabilii au fost pedepsiţi. Totuși, cu ajutorul populației și al rămășițelor, „crimele” adânc îngropate ale regimului terorist pot fi expuse, restituind dreptății o parte din justiția pierdută. De asemenea, a fost utilă examinarea evidențelor CNSAS și a hotărârilor judecătorești care au stat la baza pedepselor „dușmanilor de partid”. Acestea au fost utilizate pentru a identifica tehnicile primare de sabotaj utilizate de informatori, precum și consecințele suferite de victimele sistemului. Considerăm că studierea acestui articol este benefică tuturor celor interesați să abordeze o altă perspectivă a regimului comunist, precum și celor interesați de fenomenul sabotajului informațional, explorat în profunzime în acest articol din perspectiva infracțiunilor informatorilor. Astfel, având în vedere cele de mai sus, originalitatea lucrării de față este dată de perspectiva abordării subiectului, reușind să încheie subiectul larg al sabotajului informațional în contextul perioadei comuniste la cele mai importante aspecte studiate în acest articol.

Cuvinte cheie: informator, șantaj, recrutare, condamnare, propagandă

 

CUNOAȘTEREA ȘTIINȚIFICĂ, Volumul 3, Numărul 4, Decembrie 2024, pp.
ISSN 2821 – 8086, ISSN – L 2821 – 8086,
URL: https://www.cunoasterea.ro/information-sabotage-in-the-context-of-the-communist-regime/
© 2024 Ana-Maria PERȚA. Responsabilitatea conținutului, interpretărilor și opiniilor exprimate revine exclusiv autorilor.

 

Information sabotage in the context of the communist regime. Case study on communist informers

Ana-Maria PERȚA[1]

anamaria.perta@rocketmail.com

[1] Police Academy “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Faculty of Order and Public Safety, Bucharest

 

1. Introduction

In the context of today’s world, the forms of fraud can take various forms, from fraudsters in its traditional version, to cyber fraudsters, as well as fraudsters determined by criminal activities. For the analysis of this concept we adopted a theoretical approach, thus analyzing first the phenomenon of „information”, and then a practical one.

As we well know, society cannot exist without information and communication. The world in which society is „fed” with information is in continuous change, so today we are witnessing a process of transition from the industrial society to the informational society. In a culture where information is used widely and is valued above all else, the majority of workforce is referred to as operating in an informational society [1]. As a result, in addition to knowledge, the focus is also on the development of new lifestyles as a change in perspective. Information determines the knowledge, production, storage and application of new concepts. The forms in which it can be found varies: information can be extracted in the traditional way, from socialization and communication between individuals, from communication devices, telephones, certain applications (mail, databases, etc.). Then, in order to be perceived, the information must be expressed in a concrete form, this form being called data. By data we mean a deed, an event, a notion, represented in the conventional form suitable for communication, interpretation or manual, mechanized, automatic (dex) processing. Data is the primary element of information foundation, its symbolic representation. The transformation of data into information is obtained by processing them within an informational process. To generate the information, the data must be identified, selected, collected from various sources and processed in accordance with the informational requirements. Thus, information can be defined as a set of data that partially or totally describe a certain entity [2].

Then, continuing the analysis of this phenomenon and its applications, we will refer in what follows to sabotage. The dictionary defines sabotage as an act intended to obstruct the proper conduct of an activity or as a crime consisting of an employee’s willful failure to perform certain service obligations in a way that might compromise the state’s finances or security. Sabotage can be found in different fields and can be classified as follows: physical sabotage, psychological sabotage and economic sabotage [3]. Physical sabotage involves the destruction of resources and facilities; the psychological involves the creation of confusion, panic and fear in the environment, and economic sabotage determines the exploitation of resources and finite materials with the aim of maintaining the confusion. The reasons underlying this type of phenomenon can be various: from the desire to obtain a profit, to revenge, etc. It is considered an essential weapon in the process of conducting a war, being used in the most cunning ways. Being a necessary counter-offensive at the moment, it is used even in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, being declared that more than 20 people suspected of working for the Ukrainian SBU special services were arrested following the sabotage of a Russian military plane.

In similar situations, most of the structures resort to the use of informants, the people who carry out the activity of collecting, verifying and valorizing the data and information taken.

2. About informers

The informer can be defined as that person who knows data or information about the commission of a crime, or about the circumstances related to it, useful for solving the case and who always keeps his anonymity [4]. These are, usually, people with criminal problems or people in the circle of people suspected of committing crimes, they provide information on request about other people or about other acts.

Regarding the recruitment method, each state has a different policy, but what matters the most is the trust that the criminal prosecution bodies can have in the recruited person, a fact that most affects the veracity of the information given. Trust must be gained, just like in any other aspect of life, and the law enforcement organization will put its informant through a test before entrusting him with critical tasks or tasks that, if performed improperly, could be detrimental to the cause. The importance of valuing and extending the informants’ ability to do so in such a way that their contribution to the completion of security-related tasks was so great that it is inextricably linked to their engagement in personal activities that allowed them to carry out these tasks. The recruitment of informants is the specific task of the Security units, in close agreement with the information search plans and having in view the concrete operative goals pursued. The collaboration of the person with the Security bodies is a conscious human activity, oriented towards a previously proposed goal – the substantial contribution of the subject to the knowledge, prevention, discovery and liquidation of crimes and other antisocial acts that endanger the security of the state.

2.1 The significance of discussion

The complexity of the informant concept can generate, apart from the methods used by them (persuasion, stimulating a weakness and offering material possibilities for its fulfillment, intimidation or even blackmail on the subject of possible compromising information) the use of other means of persuasion or sabotage. Since information is the foundation of their field, finding information, seizing it, and controlling it are their goals [5]. Then, as an international phenomenon, globalization, in addition to industrial and economic transformations, also generates technological changes, at the level of communication systems. This increases the desire for development at the state level, on all levels. Technological progress determined not only improvements at the level of society, but also determined the proliferation of the crime phenomenon [6]. Here, state agencies frequently alter their approaches, which can lead to abuses. This was a common practice among security forces throughout the communist era.

Considering these, in the next chapter we will address the topic of information sabotage from the perspective of communist security informants.

2.2 Information sabotage in the consideration of communist security informants

Regardless of the circumstances in which a new source was introduced into the network, it was preceded by a detailed study, which advanced from the usual biographical information (obtained from neighbours, school or work colleagues, friends or relatives, and recorded in investigation reports) to a psychological commentary, in which the following were evaluated: the degree of general training of the candidate, the skills in gathering information, the chances and the degree of proximity to the objective pursued, the ability to conceal and, implicitly, the risk of being exposed.

Additionally, the candidate had been evaluated by other network sources who might provide positive references under the false pretense that data is being acquired on a wanted individual rather than a potential informant.

3. Approach method

Two fundamental methods constantly applied by the Security can be distinguished: recruitment by constraint or blackmail and recruitment by persuasion (or based on patriotic feelings), the latter also in the legendary recruitment version, as a secondary alternative of recruitment by persuasion [7].

Recruitment by constraint or on the basis of compromising material was a method constantly used in all stages of the history by the Security, although specialized literature considers it typical for the violent-repressive era of the communist regime, from its first years of operation. Forced recruitment is frequently applied to people with political or criminal antecedents: former political prisoners, members of bourgeois parties, former legionnaires, released officers and descendants of all these categories, alike. The officer discovered elements of blackmail or coercion during the recruitment study, and their usage was reliant on the bosses’ permission in the report that included the request to bring the new source into the network. The element of coercion or blackmail was openly invoked by the officer during the recruitment process itself, and for this reason his prior selection and evaluation was decisive.

The recruitment of informants based on patriotic feelings is recorded in archive documents as a preferred method, recommended and constantly used as a benchmark for Security work [8], as an indicator of the civic spirit and, equally, of the officer’s skill. Ideally, any recruitment should express, through the text of the Commitment, the informant’s patriotic feelings and his attachment to the regime: from the very first sentence, „the defense of the homeland and revolutionary conquests” was invoked as the obligation of every citizen, and failure to comply with this duty would result in to be sanctioned under an unspecified law.

The general rules of introducing a person into the network were also respected in the case of recruiting out of patriotic feelings: the candidate’s score, consulting other sources and investigative reports, obtaining approval from superiors, and ensuring conspiracism.  We can establish that the recruitment motivated by patriotic feelings was based either on the candidate’s co-interest (which thus established an amicable and advantageous relationship with the authorities), or on intimidation, or deception. Also, in the case of the released political prisoners, it was found that they were being monitored by the Security, and some of them were blackmailed and threatened to become informers for the Security. In the case of those who managed to start a family, the wives were observed by the Security, and the children, in some cases, could not study at the desired faculties or were kicked out of schools [9].

In the communist period, the informer was “the person who gave information to the Security about other people, usually about someone who was being followed by the secret police” [10]. As can be seen, the reasons underlying the choice of this -job- are not exactly based on people’s free will, nor do they define their own choices. Being constrained by both the system and the political regime, these people were constantly threatened, using compromising material, emotional blackmail, violence against families or even prison. Thus, the informers of communism were pushed to do everything they were told, being seen as puppets. In this atmosphere full of fear and propaganda from the years of communism, small human weaknesses have turned into vices and aberrations, profitably exploited by those put in place to maintain control over the masses of people. Being under the guidance of Soviet advisors from the KGB, the informants even used the method of sabotage to accomplish their mission.

It is also shown that the basic weapon of the state security bodies is the well-organized network of informers [11]. The quantity and quality of the information network of the State Security bodies, its fair placement on problems, the education and use of informants determine the results of the work of prevention, detection and liquidation at the right time and as completely as possible of criminal activity.

4. Case study on communist informers

In recording the status of saboteurs and acts of sabotage, we must refer to the two possible perspectives in the case of the situation projected above, and more precisely the first perspective being the one that involves the analysis of the persons accused of „sabotage” and treason, and then the second perspective, the one that denotes the sabotage actions of the informants to incriminate the innocent. Connecting us in the foreground to the era of the saboteur hunters, it is specified that a permanent battle must be fought „against the comrades who underestimate the strength and significance of sabotage” [12].

Then, “the common man had to feel threatened, in a perpetual state of insecurity, at the mercy of some obscure evil forces, forces from which only the all-powerful Party could defend him” [13]. The average person had to live in constant fear in order to suppress feelings that ran against the political system, believing that the all-powerful Party was the only one fighting for them.

4.1 The trial of the saboteurs

In consideration of those convicted for sabotage, we recall a significant historical event, namely the trial of the saboteurs [14]. Starting with an illustration of this event, we bring to the fore the works on the construction of the canal that was supposed to connect the Danube to the Black Sea, all starting in 1949 from the Soviet initiative. No one stopped to wonder if Romania could afford to allocate for a project of this magnitude. The summer of 1949 saw a hurried launch of the Canal project. In February 1950, the site organization phase had not yet been passed. The consequences showed themselves quite quickly. The technical projects of the construction were not sufficiently well documented. They worked according to sketches and plans that contained technical errors from the start. The lack of labor proved to be another major impediment to the smooth progress of the construction. The problem of personnel arose from both a quantitative and a qualitative point of view. But the saving “solution” was discovered right away: since the issue was present, someone needed to be held accountable and given severe punishment. To solve this seemingly complicated situation, it was enough for the leaders from Bucharest to draw inspiration from the Soviet experience of the Stalinist processes.

As stated in the prosecutor’s indictment in the trial filed against the “saboteurs”, the bourgeois-landlords, the class enemies, the saboteurs, and the imperialists infiltrated the Canal in order to “undermine one of the most important sectors of the socialist economy, hoping for the restoration of the bourgeois-landlord regime and the collapse of our country in a semi-colony of imperialism” [15]. About 30 people who had worked at the Canal, both engineers and workers, were identified as saboteurs, arrested and investigated. A team from the Security from Bucharest traveled to Constanta. According to the instructions received from the party, the investigation had to be completed in 15 days. In order for this deadline to be respected, the investigators had to work “day and night” [16].

The arrested were physically tortured, threatened with the arrest of their wives and children, drugged, subjected to endless interrogations in which they were not allowed to sleep. The “statements” were written in advance by the Security investigators, and the “saboteurs” had nothing else to do but sign them. Exhausted after the marathon interrogations and under the influence of drugs that annihilated any trace of resistance, they signed all the “declarations”, often without knowing their content. Before the trial, they were forced to learn by heart what they had theoretically “declared” themselves. To ensure the “poem” was remembered throughout the trial, Bucharest instructed the investigators to perform a recapitulation with each detainee individually [17].

What at the time was called “the trial of the Canal saboteurs” [18] started a week later than it had been scheduled. The “trial of the saboteurs” is part of the category of “show-trials”, which need as much assistance as possible. The public had to see that the party severely punishes anyone who opposes the “construction of socialism”. In addition, he needed “guilty” individuals for all the shortcomings of the Canal. Since they could not provide the real reasons, which were more and more complex, they blamed the “saboteurs”. There was no purpose to keep them in the dark. On the contrary, they had to be known by as many people as possible, so that the punishment would achieve its political goals. Cast in a cynical and useful show for the regime, defendants, judges, lawyers and the public each played their assigned role. Thus, in order to accredit the idea that the irregularities were the consequence of an act of sabotage and to divert attention from the true causes, legal actions were staged against some innocent people. In these actions, people were sacrificed: three people who were innocent of committing any criminal act (and were executed) in order to justify a totally compromised idea.

Two trials took place, and in the first trial, ten people, mostly engineers, educated abroad, were investigated and sentenced to death and hard labor for life. Through sentence no. 1 from September 1, 1952, were sentenced to death: Aurel Rozei Rozenberg (engineer), Petre Cernătescu (electromechanical engineer), Georgescu Gheorghe-Topaziau (mechanical engineer), Nicolae Vasilescu (mine engineer), Dumitru Nichita (locomotive mechanic, which had only two primary classes). Nicolaie Frangopol (electronics engineer) and Mircea Ciorapciu (construction engineer) were sentenced to hard labor for life, and Petre Vieru was sentenced to 20 years of hard labor. The sentence remained final by rejecting the defendants’ appeal. Of the five defendants sentenced to death, Aurel Rozei, Nicolae Vasilescu and Dumitru Nichita were executed on October 13, 1952, and for the other two the sentence was commuted to hard labor for life.

Naturally, we are unable to classify the event under a single category of sabotage because we believe that the methods used can be classified as both political (in this case, protecting the movement’s leaders) and industrial (using sabotage as a means of self-defense of the totalitarian regime). On the other hand, we are given certainty about the means of sabotage, considering them to be among the most diverse, from psychological and physical sabotage to information sabotage. This appears in the forgery of statements and records, the physical and mental exhaustion of the suspects to prevent them from rebelling, and their signing of all the paperwork attesting to their guilt and incrimination.

In this context, the accused actually became the victims of sabotage, of a faulty system, being harshly punished, perhaps even paying with their lives.

4.2 The Great Finance

The second perspective is constituted by the sabotage actions of the informants, actions that clearly fall under information sabotage. The reasons behind the information sabotage can be represented by changes that violate the usual way of life within the system or only the blaming of disadvantaged people or people without means of counterattack. In this case, a large trial of “conspirators, spies and saboteurs” was “staged” in Bucharest. The communists invented a “group” of twelve people (some of them did not even know each other), whom they accused of having a plan to “undermine the popular-democratic regime” with the help of the Americans. Inspired by the Soviet model, among the practices of intimidation of the population were the trials of “saboteurs of the economy”. “Saboteurs” and “class enemies” were being sought for the economy that was not working because it was based on uncertain things. After the wave of arrests that began in 1947, the communists had enough “enemies of the regime” to whom they could organize trials. In addition to being punished for a variety of false criminal acts, they were also involved in further trials, which the dictatorship staged to show that the “class enemy” was still working. This is what happened in October 1948, when party propaganda announced the start of the trial of the “group of conspirators, spies and saboteurs”, known as the “Great Finance”. Twelve people, with no major connections between them, were brought to justice, because they allegedly had a plan to sabotage the economy, in “close connection with the American imperialists”. Industrialists, engineers, soldiers and legionnaires were included in a real movie scenario, with conspiratorial meetings, arms collections and financing from the “decadent West”. According to the transcripts of the trial published by propaganda, the accused admitted their deeds. But from the subsequent testimonies of some “participants” it appears that their statements were forged, or they signed some papers that they did not have the right to read.

4.3 Charges

The indictment is a sample of how a political trial can be fabricated, without the defendants being able to defend themselves. The twelve were put in charge of deeds impossible to achieve under the conditions in which the communists and the Red Army controlled Romania. For example, Popp, Bujoiu and Gheorghe Manu were made responsible for organizing a coup by armed insurrection, as early as 1945.

In the view of the investigators-screenwriters, in parallel with the coup plan, the defendants would have also organized acts of economic sabotage: using their position as leaders of the largest enterprise, Uzinele and Resita Domains, in the execution of the directives of the American representatives, the accused Max Auschnit and Alexandru Popp begin to organize acts of sabotage, with the aim of damaging heavy industry and undermining confidence in the measures taken by the government in order to recover the country’s post-war economy [19]. It was found that following the acts of sabotage executed at Reşita, the production decreased with a catastrophic speed; in the meantime, the accused Popp and Auschnit, by stockpiling products, prevented their entry into the economic circuit of the country, or caused the production of goods of very low quality. Once these “accusations” were elaborated, the investigators built a hallucinatory story, in which the twelve worked day and night to destroy the “conquests of the party people”. The legionnaire defendants were generally accused of ensuring contact with the outside, through Eugen Teodorescu, who transmitted the secrets of the Romanian economy to the American „imperialists”.

The „Great Finance” process was exploited to the maximum by the regime’s propaganda. „Scanteia” daily noted the „atmosphere” at the trial, „embarrassing” the „saboteurs”. Also, the “working people” sent letters to the “press organ” of the PMR, demanding inhumane treatment for those accused of opposing “people’s democracy”: “to be strangled to death”, “to be dragged on a wheel”, “to their eyes gouged out and their nails pulled out” etc. Also, the witnesses brought by the authorities supported the scenario built by the indictment, demanding „exemplary” punishment of the „saboteurs”.

One of the victims of the Great Finance process was professor George Manu. Between 1945 and 1947, George Manu managed to hide from the communists and wrote the study “Behind the Iron Curtain. Romania under Soviet occupation”. The communists accused him of revealing state secrets to the Western powers through this work. “It was categorized as an act of betrayal, espionage, exactly the opposite of reality. He is one of those who very quickly intuited the direction in which Romania will go”, says Silviu B. Moldovan, CNSAS researcher [20]. The main tool used by the communists during the investigation was torture. To prove that George Manu was a spy enslaved to the West, four-class investigators invented accusations against him. “Being so cruelly beaten, he admitted this plot, that he wanted to dig a gallery to Parliament, which was nonsense. Even in a year, you couldn’t dig something that big. He said that he hoped the trials would demonstrate how ridiculous this charge is. They achieved their desired outcome exactly. „Something incredible,” says Nicolae Mărgineanu [21].

Prior to the Great Finance trial, the saboteurs served additional sentences that were added to their years in prison by the Military Court. These sentences included lifelong hard labor and other penalties. George Manu was imprisoned at Aiud and given life sentence of hard labor. He will start teaching numerous prisoners here. George Manu was given permission to operate in the Dubna nuclear center by the Soviet officials. As long as he gave up his principles, that is. They called him to prison and offered him to work in Dubna. But Manu knew very well that Dubna was the atomic center of the USSR. He said that „I fought against the communists, so I will not work for the Soviets”, says Gheorghe Jijie [22].

For the same reason, George Manu refused, even though he was in agony, to renounce his ideals, as requested by the torturer of the Aiud prison, Gheorghe Crăciun. „And, refusing, Crăciun also refused his medicines. They let him die in his own way. They put him in the infirmary when nothing could actually be done. And they didn’t even do anything”, says Şerban Manu.

George Manu died in Aiud in 1961. He was 58 years old and weighed 34 kilograms. His body was thrown into the mass grave at Robilor ravine.

5. Conclusion

Information sabotage has been present throughout time in all societies, constituting the state’s foundation from a certain point of view. The presence of this phenomenon during the communist period represented a determining factor of the continuity of the communist regime, but also a factor to its collapse. Combating is possible and recommended, but of course it will not be possible to achieve it completely. The human being is, above all, a sociable being, not prone to loneliness and in the process of communication of the population, distribution of information or even manipulation, elements of sabotage appear necessarily.

Taking into account the development of sabotage in the communist regime, we state that information sabotage severely damaged communist governments by undermining confidence and encouraging disagreements. Saboteurs damaged government operations and the legitimacy of state propaganda by intercepting, modifying, or destroying communication. The public became more confused and mistrusting of the government and policies as a result. The collapse of communist regimes was partly caused by their incapacity to regulate the flow of information, which exposed their weaknesses.

Overall, the global community is greatly impacted by information sabotage, which affects multiple areas of international relations, politics, and society. Saboteurs have the ability to erode public confidence in institutions, destabilise governments, and intensify conflicts through the intentional manipulation or disruption of information flows. As it has been presented above, this kind of sabotage increases scepticism and division by undermining public trust in the government, the media, and other major organisations. Worldwide, misinformation and disinformation efforts can exacerbate tensions between countries, making information sabotage a strain on diplomatic ties.

Combating informational sabotage on a national and global scale requires an understanding of the issue. Since understanding the criminal phenomena is the first step towards prevention, I felt it was important to draw attention to the topic at issue and provide a clearer picture of information sabotage that exists today. Thus, the comprehension of the subject by the readers governs the purpose of writing this article.

References

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